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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
  
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant, Nicholas Carrara, served as president of 
Omega Network Systems, Inc., which provided various labor unions, 
municipalities, and other companies with administrative services 
for health care claims.  Carrara engaged in two unrelated 
fraudulent schemes for which he was charged: a Woodbridge 
Township embezzlement scheme and a Teamsters kickback scheme.  
During his trial, Carrara pleaded guilty to a one-count 
information charging him with a dual conspiracy: (1) making 
kickback payments to one Zingone; and (2) misappropriating 
$650,000 in Woodbridge Township insurance funds.   
 On appeal, Carrara contends that the government's 
refusal to move for a downward departure under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1 was punitive and violated his 
constitutional rights; that the government's failure to recommend 
a departure breached the government's plea agreement with him; 
that even though he breached the agreement, it should not be 
nullified because the government still benefitted from his 
cooperation; and, that the disparity between the sentence imposed 
on Carrara and the sentences imposed on his co-defendants makes 
his sentences unlawful.  On these issues, we will affirm.  On 
Carrara's claim that the district court failed to make the 
required factual findings to support its restitution order, 
however, we will reverse and remand. 
 
 
 
  
 I.   
 Carrara entered into a cooperating plea agreement with 
the government that required him to disclose truthfully all 
information on all matters into which the United States 
Attorney's Office inquired.  Carrara also agreed to provide 
truthful testimony to the Grand Jury and at trial.  Additionally, 
he agreed that if he gave any materially false information or 
testimony, his plea agreement would be void.  For the 
government's part, it agreed that if Carrara fully complied with 
the terms of the agreement, it would file a § 5K1.1 motion, 
seeking a downward departure from Carrara's sentencing guideline 
range. 
 Carrara cooperated with the government and gave 
information by which the government was able to convict several 
individuals.  That is undisputed.  Nonetheless, the government 
did not file a § 5K1.1 motion for a cooperation departure, and at 
sentencing Carrara received no benefit for his cooperation.   
Carrara's departure issues are resolved against him by an 
affidavit he filed, which he now admits was materially false, 
because in filing it he breached his plea agreement and relieved 
the government of its obligations.   
 A.  
 The government had filed a motion to disqualify 
Carrara's counsel based upon a conflict of interest.  Carrara 
filed a cross motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, 
requesting that the court order the U.S. Attorney's Office to 
recuse, and urging the court to dismiss the indictment against 
  
him.  In support of his motion, Carrara filed an affidavit 
stating that although he pleaded guilty he was actually innocent.  
In his affidavit, Carrara accused the government of trying to 
pressure him into lying when it did not like the information he 
provided.  Based upon his affidavit, his newly alleged innocence 
and the government's misconduct, Carrara sought to withdraw his 
guilty plea.  This affidavit, however, created more problems for 
Carrara than it solved and placed Carrara in a real dilemma: if 
the affidavit were true, his earlier trial testimony was perjury; 
if the trial testimony were true, the affidavit was perjury.  In 
sum, Carrara is "hoisted by his own petard."  
 Because of the several twists and turns of events, the 
district court held what amounted to a full Rule 11 hearing when 
Carrara reaffirmed his guilty plea.  During the hearing, Carrara 
affirmed on the record that he knew what he was doing and that 
his plea was voluntary; that he understood the penalties he was 
facing, and he affirmed the factual basis for his guilty plea.  
The government also recorded its position on Carrara's decision 
to reaffirm his guilty plea and its decision not to file a  
§ 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure for Carrara.1   
 The district court pointed out that when Carrara 
reaffirmed his guilty plea, he was aware that the government was 
not going to file a § 5K1.1 motion.  The court added that even if 
                     
1
.  The government did agree to take the position that, even 
despite the false affidavit, Carrara's equation should not be 
enhanced two points for obstruction of justice and in fact should 
be reduced two levels for acceptance of responsibility. 
  
the government had filed the motion, "I would have denied it, for 
it is within my discretion to do so."  At issue before us is 
whether the government's refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion is a 
breach of its agreement with Carrara.  What Carrara seeks is 
specific performance of that agreement. 
    B. 
 It is axiomatic that it is within the government's 
discretion whether to seek a § 5K1.1 departure for substantial 
cooperation.  Moreover, a claim by a defendant that he has 
"merely provided substantial assistance will not entitle a 
defendant to a remedy...or an evidentiary hearing."   Wade v. 
United States, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 1844 (1992) (holding that courts 
have authority to review and grant a remedy to defendants who can 
show the prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance 
motion "was based upon an unconstitutional motive."  Id.)  
Nonetheless, as in this case, once the government makes an 
agreement with a defendant to file a motion, it is bound by the 
terms of the agreement.  It is a simple matter of contract law. 
United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 
1989).  What Carrara seems to ignore, however, is that the 
agreement works both ways.  Not only must the government comply 
with its terms and conditions, but so must he.  Here it is 
undisputed that Carrara violated the agreement, his allegations 
of pressure from the government notwithstanding, because he 
supported his motion to withdraw his guilty plea with a 
materially false affidavit.   
  
 Carrara seeks to absolve himself of this (or these) 
falsehoods by contending that he filed the affidavit upon advice 
of ineffective counsel.  This may be a reason, but it is not an 
excuse.  The fact of the matter is -- he lied.  Having done so, 
he cannot come before the court with unclean hands and request 
that the government now be ordered to perform his version of 
equity.  Specific performance requires that the court enforce 
every portion of the agreement, which most specifically here 
includes the government's right to withhold its motion because 
Carrara gave false testimony.   
 The plea agreement explicitly states: 
 
 Nicholas Carrara shall truthfully disclose 
all information concerning all matters about 
which this office inquires of him.  Nicholas 
Carrara shall make himself available at all 
reasonable times requested by representatives 
of the Government and shall truthfully 
testify in the grand jury and at any trial as 
to any subject about which he is questioned.  
 
Appendix, 15 (emphasis added).  It further provides:   
 
 Should Nicholas Carrara withdraw from this 
agreement . . . or should it be established 
that Nicholas Carrara has given materially 
false, incomplete, or misleading testimony or 
information or otherwise has violated any 
provision of this agreement, the agreement 
and its benefits to Nicholas Carrara shall be 
null and void.   
 
Appendix, 16 (emphasis added).  Finally, the agreement gives an 
unambiguous warning that if Carrara were to provide misleading or 
false testimony, he would be prosecuted for perjury.  This 
underscores a basic premise of the plea agreement; that is, he 
  
must provide the government with truthful and reliable 
information that will aid it.   
 C. 
 We also reject Carrara's argument that it is unfair for 
the government to reap the benefits of the plea agreement and 
avoid its responsibilities to him.  In short, given Carrara's 
breach, the government no longer has any responsibility to 
request downward departure.  Moreover, to the extent that the 
government benefitted from information Carrara provided, the 
government was also put in the unenviable position of having to 
ascertain what aspects of Carrara's testimony were true and what 
were lies.  Carrara entered into the plea agreement and then 
violated it.  He must now endure the results of his dishonesty. 
 D. 
 For all of the foregoing, we conclude that the 
government's actions in refusing to file a § 5K1.1 motion were 
proper.  Where, as here, the government is not controlled by an 
agreement, it has the power but not the duty to file a  
§ 5K1.1 motion.  Wade v. United States, 112 S.Ct. at 1843.  
Where, as here, the assistance rendered is flawed because of the 
defendant's dishonesty, the government is fully justified in not 
filing a motion.2   
                     
2
.  Carrara also contends that the disparity between his sentence 
and that imposed upon others is contrary to the policy of the 
sentencing guidelines, and requests that his sentence be vacated 
and the matter remanded for resentencing.  We will affirm on this 
issue as well.  Carrara was sentenced to a 46-month term of 
imprisonment.  This is within the sentencing guideline range of 
41 to 51 months, and a sentencing disparity among co-defendants 
is not a proper basis upon which to base a departure from the 
  
 II. 
 Finally, appellant contends that the district court 
erred by ordering him to pay $650,000 in restitution.  He does 
not challenge the victims' losses, but contends only that the 
court's award is not supported by a finding that he is 
financially able to pay restitution.  On this issue the 
government concedes error, and after careful examination of the 
record we agree that the district court erred.  See United States 
v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 1985).   
 Historically restitution has occupied a prominent 
penological position.  It predates fines and prison, and in the 
earliest penal codes, it was always awarded to the victim of a 
property crime -- usually in addition to punishment.3  
Restitution has customarily been awarded to answer various 
penological concerns.  It is primarily restorative and is 
supposed, at least partially, to replace victims in the financial 
position they occupied before the offense was committed against 
them.  See generally S.Rep No. 532, 97th Cong.2d Sess. 30, 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2536-39.  In that sense, 
restitution is also remonstrative, and, where indicated, will 
require that offenders disgorge their illgotten gains.  United 
States v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 678-81 (3d Cir. 1993).  Then too, 
(..continued) 
guidelines.  In sum, there is simply no support for appellant's 
position on this issue. 
3
.  The Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon ca. B.C.E. 2285-2242, 
imposes the death sentence for 27 crimes, and restitution 
sentence for over 50 crimes. Trans. C.H.W. Johns, M.S., 
Edinburgh, (1905). 
  
restitution is rehabilitative because it permits or indeed 
requires that offenders personally face what they have done and, 
at least partially, atone for their legal transgressions by 
direct action in the form of a positive personal performance.4  
Congress requires, however, that when restitution is indicated 
the district court consider both the loss sustained by the victim 
and the offender's financial resources, financial needs, and 
present and potential earning ability.  18 U.S.C. § 3664(a).   
 The question whether the district court erred here is 
very close, however, because at sentencing defense counsel 
introduced no financial evidence of Carrara's ability to pay.  He 
argued, nonetheless, that Carrara did not have any personal 
assets to make restitution.  Significantly, he also informed the 
court that Carrara had another attorney assisting in filing 
claims against insurance companies that provide coverage to Omega 
Network Systems, seeking funds from them to repay the 
embezzlement victims.  By letter, Carrara's civil attorney 
informed the district court that the insurance proceeds 
"arguably, may well provide [Woodbridge] with restitution."  He 
added that there also "exists a reasonable probability that a 
recovery against [other] third party defendants...will be 
obtained."   
 The district court then ordered Carrara to pay 
restitution, but added that Carrara would be credited for 
                     
4
.  See Richard E. Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of its 
Past History and an Analysis of its Present Usefulness, 5 U. 
Rich. L.Rev. 71, 80-82 (1970). 
  
payments made by insurance companies or third parties.  In doing 
so, it appears that the district court may well have 
appropriately considered the aims and goals of restitution.  
Moreover, although New Jersey law follows the general rule that 
"an insurer may not contract to indemnify an insured against the 
civil consequences of his own wilful act,"  Vargas v. Hudson 
County Bd. of Elections, 949 F.2d 665, 673 (3d Cir. 1991) quoting 
Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (1978), it, 
nonetheless, has no public policy prohibiting an indemnity in the 
unique circumstances presented here, if Carrara does not benefit 
and an innocent third person will receive the protection afforded 
by the insurance.  Ambassador, 388 A.2d at 606-607 (1978).   
 The difficulty is that under the court's restitution 
order, if Carrara were not successful with these third-party 
payers, he would be liable for the entire amount.  Defense 
counsel argued that Carrara is currently indigent.  That, 
however, is not determinative.  Congress recognized that 
indigency may be temporary and that even an indigent offender may 
be compelled to pay restitution, if necessary, during the period 
of up to five years after incarceration.  18 U.S.C § 3572(d).  
Hence, the district court was required to make the necessary 
factual findings on all factors bearing on Carrara's current and 
future ability to pay it.  United States v. Logar,  975 F.2d 958, 
961-64 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 The restitution order is not adequately supported here 
because the district court did not make specific findings whether 
third-party payers exist, which the record suggests is so, or 
  
whether Carrara is able to pay without them, which the records 
suggests is not so.  Moreover, if restitution or its amount is to 
be conditioned upon payments from insurance companies or third 
party payers, or if Carrara's liability has an upper limit, the 
order must expressly say so.  Finally, the court must structure 
the award so that no portion of Carrara's restitutionary burden 
is relieved by payments from insurance proceeds.  Ambassador 388 
A.2d at 606-607.  Because the district court's order is not so 
conditioned, limited or supported, we will remand the cause and 
allow the district court to make the necessary inquiries and 
findings. 
 III. 
 In sum, we affirm the district court's sentence except 
as to restitution.  We will vacate the portion of Carrara's 
sentence awarding restitution and remand the cause to the 
district court, giving it the opportunity to hear evidence and 
make factual findings sufficient to support the order at issue, 
or in the alternative, to enter a new order in an amount and upon 
conditions it deems both appropriate and not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
